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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
mitted evidence obtained during an illegal search until 195327 when the
excIusionary rule was adopted by statute.28
Although the Court's consideration of the question of constitution-
ality of state searches and seizures could have best been avoided by
adhering to the policy of deciding a case on other than constitutional
grounds if at all possible,29 its pronouncement, of a rule of evidence
seems sound. The uniformity achieved in federal criminal prosecutions
by applying the same rule regardless of whether the search is by state
or federal officers is wholly desirable.
G. MARLiN EvANs
Torts---Res Ipsa Loquitur-Unexplained Automobile Accidents.
In Lane v. Dorney1 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to unexplained
single-car automobile accidents. The plaintiff relied on Etheridge v.
Etheridge2 as holding that res ipsa was applicable to such accidents.
The court stated, however, that the doctrine was not applied in Eth-
eridge.
In Etheridge the defendant was driving along a dirt road at a moder-
ate rate of speed. As the defendant crossed an intersection his car
swerved to the right, ran into a ditch, and turned over. The defendant
offered testimony that he was not able to turn the car back toward the
center of the road for some unknown reason and that his brakes did
not seem to take hold. The court held that the evidence was sufficient
to withstand a nonsuit. Though the words "res ipsa loquitur" were
not used, the court stated the applicable rule to be as follows:
When a thing which caused an injury is shown to be under the
control and operation of the party charged with negligence and
the accident is one which, in the ordinary course of things, will
not happen if those who have such control and operation use
proper care, the accident itself, in the absence of an explanation
by the party charged, affords some evidence that it arose from
want of proper care.... The rule has found limited application
in automobile cases. It applies when the accident is one which
"State v. Vanhoy, 230 N.C. 162, 52 S.E.2d 278 (1949); State v. Simmons,
183 N.C. 684, 110 S.E. 591 (1922); State v. Wallace, 162 N.C. 623, 78 S.E. 1(1913).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §15-27.1 (Supp. 1959).
For a discussion of the use of illegally obtained evidence in state courts, see Note,
33 N.C.L. REV. 100 (1954).
' "The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(concurring opinion).
1250 N.C. 15, 108 S.E.2d 55 (1959).
2222 N.C. 616, 24 S.E.2d 477 (1943).
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does not happen in the ordinary course of events where reason-
able care is used, and the cause of the accident or the loss of con-
trol resulting in the accident, such as an obstruction in the road,
a flat tire, or skidding, does not affirmatively appear.8
This portion of the Etheridge opinion has been cited and relied up-
on by the North Carolina court in other unexplained automobile acci-
dent cases in which the jury was allowed to decide the question of
negligence.4 In addition Etheridge has apparently been interpreted by
the bar of North Carolina as applying res ipsa.5 And furthermore, the
language used in Etheridge is quite similar to the classic definition of
res ipsa loquitur, enunciated in Scott v. London & St. Katherine Dodks
Co." In view of the similarity of the rules enunciated in Etheridge and
London Docks, it is not difficult to understand how it was "mistakenly"
thought that res ipsa was applied by the court in Etheridge.7
The facts before the court in Lane v. Dorney are as follows: Mr.
Dorney was driving the automobile on a clear night, accompanied by
Mr. Lane in the front seat and Mrs. Lane and Mrs. Dorney in the back
seat. Mr. Dorney was in good health, and his vehicle was in good
mechanical condition. The highway was hard surfaced, eighteen feet
wide, and had dirt shoulders three feet wide. The surface was dry
and free from defects. No other travelers were using the highway at
the time and place of the accident. As the vehicle was proceeding
downhill on a long, sweeping curve to the left, it ran off the road to
the right over an embankment, apparently jumped a stream, and was
completely demolished. Mr. Dorney and Mr. Lane were, killed. A
tire track was discovered on the right shoulder leading over to the em-
bankment; there was no evidence to suggest thai the vehicle had left
the road at any place other than as indicated by the tire mark'. Mrs.
Dorney, the only witness, testified as follows:
3Id. at 619, 24 S.E2d at 479-80. (Emphasis added.)
' Edwards v. Cross, 233 N.C. 354, 64 S.E2d 6 (1951); Wyrick v. Ballard
Co., 224 N.C. 301, 29 S.E.2d 900 (1944); Boone v. Matheny, 224 N.C. 250, 29
S.E.2d 687 (1944).
5 Affidavits from disinterested attorneys show their belief that the Lane de-
cision was a departure from the rule of Etheridge as to the application of res
ipsa to unexplained single-car collisions. Petition to Rehear, p. 23, Lane v. Dorney,
252 N.C. 90, 113 S.E.2d 33 (1960).
'3 H. & C. 596, 159 Eng. Rep. 665 (1865). "There must be reasonable evi-
dence of negligence. But where the thing is shown to be under the management
of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that
the accident arose from want of proper care." Id. at 601, 159 Eng. "Rep. at 667.
""The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently applied the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in a civil action for personal injuries arising out of an unexplained
automobile accident." Note, 21 N.C.L. Rav. 402 (1943). It is also interesting to
note that of the thirty-nine cases cited and relied upon by the court in Etheridge,
thirty three cases expressly dealt with the applicability of res ipsa.
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I was not conscious of anything unusual happening on the road
before... this crash. I do not know whether there was any
skidding of the car before the crash.... I was not conscious of
any swerving of the car while it was on the paved portion of the
road. I was not conscious of the car hitting anything in the road
or anything of that sort.8
On the first appeal of this case the court, after refusing to apply
res ipsa, affirmed the nonsuit entered below and stated,
Negligence is not presumed from the mere fact of injury....
There must be legal evidence of every material fact necessary to
support a verdict, and the verdict "must be grounded on a reason-
able certainty as to probabilities arising from a fair considera-
tion of the evidence, and not a mere guess, or on possibilities."...
Testing plaintiffs' evidence by these principles in determining its
sufficiency to show negligence.., in the operation of the auto-
mobile, the question is left in the realm of conjecture and sur-
mise. Just what happened to bring about the "great impact" as
characterized by Mrs. Dorney is pure guesswork.9
Had this been the final decision on the case, the result would seem
to have been a reversal of Etheridge and a readoption of the rules re-
quiring that negligence be established by affirmative evidence.10  How-
ever, upon rehearing the case, the court reversed the trial court and its
own prior decision and held that even though the doctrine of res ipsa
was not applicable, there was sufficient evidence of negligence to with-
stand a nonsuit. The court stated:
There was no evidence of a blowout, of blinding lights, of skid-
ding, or of mechanical defects, or of negligence on the part of
another traveler. Thus Mrs. Dorney's evidence, though some-
what negative, nevertheless tends to remove everything that
might have influenced the movement of the car, causing it to
leave the road, save and except the hands of the man at the
wheel.... Why Mr. Dorney drove off the road may be "guess-
work," but the fact remains he Was at the wheel and in control
of the vehicle when it left the road."
In view of this decision on rehearing it is difficult to understand
why the North Carolina Supreme Court was so emphatic in enuncia-
ting that res ipsa will not be applied in these cases. 12 The apparent
' Lane v. Dorney, 250 N.C. 15, 18, 108 S.E.2d 55, 57 (1959).
'Id at 21, 22, 108 S.E.2d at 59, 60.
10 Lane v. Dorney, 250 N.C. 15, 108 S.E.2d 55 (1959) ; Sowers v. Marley, 235
N.C. 607, 70 S.E.2d 670 (1952); Mills v. Moore, 219 N.C. 25, 12 S.E.2d 661
(1941).11252 N.C. at 94, 113 S.E.2d at 36 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
12 This doctrine is applied in similar cases in a number of other jurisdictions.
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utilization of this doctrine in North Carolina has not met with any
dissent in the past. In addition, though the court stated that the doc-
trine would not be applied, it appears that the court did in fact utilize
the underlying principle of res ipsa in reaching its decision.
Res ipsac loquitur, as applied by a majority of the states, is a rule
of probabilities arising from circumstantial evidence.' 3 The rule is
used only when the cause of the accident is not affirmatively shown and
it is necessary to rely upon the circumstances to determine cause.1 4 If,
when all the facts and circumstances surrounding an accident are con-
sidered, it is more probable that the accident resulted from negligence
of the defendant than from some other cause, the issue of negligence
will be submitted to the jury. 5
In the principal case the court held that the physical facts and sur-
rounding circumstances presented a case for the jury.16 Concededly,
circumstantial evidence may be used to establish affirmatively some
particular negligent act or forbearance on the part of the defendant.
For example, evidence that the automobile continued a long distance
after the collision and did serious damage in the process would tend to
For example, in a Minnesota decision a car ran off the road on a curve and over-
turned. The court stated that "the car left the paved road, went over the shoulder,
and turned over. This made a prima facie case of negligence for plaintiff....
Such is the rule of res ipsa loquitur which is applicable." Nicol %. Geitler, 188
Minn. 69, 73, 247 N.W. 8, 10 (1933). The California court considered these
facts: There was no obstruction or defect in the pavement, which was level,
dry, and twenty-two feet wide. The evening was clear and there was no indica-
tion that any other vehicle had been near defendant's automobile at the time of
the accident. The defendant testified that she did not know what caused the
car to go off the road and collide with the tree. The court stated: "Since it can-
not be successfully claimed that an automobile would ordinarily leave a ... high-
way under the circumstances shok.n in the instant case ... without at least some
negligence on the part of the person who was in exclusive control thereof, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must be applied." Fiske v. Wilkie, 67 Cal. App. 2d
440, 447, 154 P.2d 725, 729 (Dist. Ct App. 1945). See also Ralston v. Dossey,
289 Ky. 40, 157 S.W.2d 739 (1941) (auto left road in attempting to pass and
turned over trying to return to the highway); Lindsey v. Williams, 260 S.W.2d
472 (Mo. 1953) (auto left highway and collided with a tree); Smith v. Kirby,
115 N.J.L. 225, 178 A. 739 (1935) (auto left highway and struck a tree) ; Morrow
v. Hume, 131 Ohio St. 319, 3 N.E.2d 39 (1936) (auto left road and hit a tele-
phone pole). See generally Ghiardi, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Wisconsin, 39 MMQ.
L. REV. 361 (1956); Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 C.Lin. L. RL.
183 (1949); Note, 37 B.U.L. R-v. 213 (1957); Note, 40 VA. L. Rnv. 951 (1954).
"'See PaossER, ToRTs § 43 (2d ed. 1955). See also Note, 3 UTAH L. REV.
113 (1952).
", Lea v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 246 N.C. 287, 98 S.E.2d 9 (1957);
Payne v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 205 N.C. 32, 169 S.E. 831 (1933) ; Springs
v. Doll, 197 N.C. 240, 148 S.E. 251 (1929).
" Wyrick v. Ballard Co., 224 N.C. 301, 29 S.E.2d 900 (1944) ; McRainey v.
Virginia & C. So. Ry., 168 N.C. 570, 84 S.E. 851 (1915).
" Note the following statement regarding the meaning of res ipsa: "The doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur . . . does not mean that negligence can be assumed from
the mere fact of an accident and injury, but ... is a short way of saying that
the circumstances attending upon the accident are in themselves of such a char-
acter as to justify a jury in inferring negligence as the cause of the injury."
Barger v. Chelpon, 60 S.D. 66, 70, 243 N.W. 97, 98 (1932).
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establish that the automobile was traveling at excessive speed.17 Simi-
larly, evidence that two vehicles approached each other on a street in
the daytime, and one driver did not see the other vehicle, though his
view was unobstructed, would tend to establish that this driver failed
to maintain a proper lookout."' However, this is not the sole manner
in which circumstantial evidence may be used. The evidence may not
only be used to establish a definite negligent act on the part of the
driver, but it also may be used to establish that it was more probable
that the accident was caused by negligent conduct on the part of the
defendant than by something for which he would not be responsible.
The latter usage is embodied in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and,
it is submitted, is the usage of circumstantial evidence adopted by the
court in the principal case.
The refusal of the courts to apply res ipsa in a two-car accident
indicates that the application of the doctrine depends upon circumstan-
tial evidence which tends to establish negligence as the more probable
cause of the accident, as distinguished from circumstantial evidence
establishing a definite act of negligence. This refusal is based upon the
theory that in such cases it is not more probable that one driver, rather
than the other, was negligent.' However, if the application of res ipsa
depended upon circumstantial evidence tending to establish a particular
negligent act as the cause of the accident, the doctrine could easily be
applied to multi-car accidents.
The evidence of Mrs. Dorney, though of a negative nature, was
accepted by the court as affirmatively removing certain causes of the
accident which, if proved by the defendant, would relieve him of liabil-
ity. It is settled that testimony by a witness that he was not aware
of certain events, when the witness was-in a position to observe these
events had they occurred, raises a positive inference that they did not
occur.2 0 Thus the fact that Mrs. Dorney, a passenger in the defend-
ant's car, was not aware of any unusual happening on the road, any
skidding of the car, any blinding lights of other travelers, or the car's
hitting anything in the road tended to remove these factors as possible
causes of the accident. This evidence, however, did not affirmatively
"'Volksen v. Kelly, 12 N.J. Super. 202, 79 A.2d 319 (App. Div. 1951);
Yokeley v. Kearns, 223 N.C. 196, 25 S.E.2d 602 (1943) ; 10 BLASrFIEL, CYCLO-
PED A OF AuTomoBins LAW & PRAcTicE § 6560 (1955).8 Rounds v. Fitzgerald, 207 App. Div. 534, 202 N.Y. Supp. 595 (1924).
" PRossER, ToRTs § 42 (2d ed. 1955). However in an action by a third party
passenger in one of the vehicles against the drivers of both vehicles, the doctrine
could be applied on the theory that both drivers were more probably negligent
than not, although this application is not commonly allowed. PRossER, op. cit.
supra at 206-07.
"Hill v. Norfolk So. Ry., 195 N.C. 605, 143 S.E. 129 (1928); Edwards v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 129 N.C. 78, 39 S.E. 730 (1901) ; Purnell v. Raleigh &
G.R.R., 122 N.C. 832, 29 S.E. 953 (1898).
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show any negligent act or forbearance on the part of the defendant
which caused the accident. The evidence merely seemed to increase
the probability that the accident was the result of some negligence of
the driver by removing these possible non-negligent causes.
The apparent utilization of the underlying principle of res ipsa and
a simultaneous rejection of the doctrine itself, as in the Lane decision,
can only lead to uncertainty as to what evidence will be required to
raise a question for the jury in unexplained single-car automobile acci-
dent cases. Under this decision it seems that where the plaintiff is
unable to present evidence which affirmatively shows the cause of an
accident, he may be able to withstand a nonsuit by producing testimony
which tends to remove possible causes of the accident for which defend-
ant would not be responsible. However, a question remains as to what
possible causes must be removed before the case can be submitted to the
jury. It appears that the plantiff must at least negative mechanical fail-
ure,2 1 skidding,22 blowouts, 23 negligence on the part of another trav-
eler,2 4 and sudden illness of the driver.25
The adoption of the doctrine of res ipsa and its application within
the limits previously established by our court26 would create a uniform
set of rules for inferring negligence from circumstantial evidence. No
such uniformity exists within the rule of Lane v. Dorney.
JoaN D. WARLICK, JR.
Wills-Construction-Right of Adopted Children To Take Under
a Will as "Grandchildren."
Adoption through judicial proceedings, a process nonexistent
under the common law, received statutory sanction in the United States
more than a century ago.' In recent years, as adoption steadily has
2 1Ferry v. Holmes & Barnes, Ltd., 12 La. App. 3, 124 So. 848 (1929).
22 Springs v. Doll, 197 N.C. 240, 148 S.E. 251 (1929).
22 Clodfelter v. Wells, 212 N.C. 823, 195 S.E. 11 (1938).
Pridgen v. Produce Co., 199 N.C. 560, 155 SE. 247 (1930).Cohen v. Petty, 65 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
"The principle does not apply: (1) when all the facts causing the accident
are known and testified to by witnesses at the trial; (2) where more than one
inference can be drawn from the evidence as to the cause of the injury; (3)
where the existence of negligent defaut is not the more reasonable probability, and
where the occurrence, without more, leaves the matter resting only in conjecture;
(4) where it appears that the accident was due to a cause beyond the control of
the defendant, such as the act of God or the wrongful or tortious act of a
stranger; (5) when the instrumentality causing the injury is not under the ex-
clusive control or management of the defendant; (6) where the injury results
from accident as defined and contemplated by law.' Spring v. Doll, 197 N.C.
240, 242, 148 S.E. 251, 252-53 (1929).
'Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743
(1956). This article contains an excellent discussion of the statutory evolve-
ment in this country of the institution of adoption. In North Carolina statutory
adoption reaches back to 1873. N.C. Pub. Laws 1872-73, ch. 155.
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